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Hubler: United States v. Newland
UNITED STATES V. NEWLAND

Judicial notice allows courts to acknowledge a proposition as conclusive1
without requiring any party to introduce evidence of that proposition's truth.
Because judicial notice establishes propositions without the introduction of
evidence, the doctrine can significantly influence the outcome of litigation while
simultaneously reducing the length of trial. Similarly, unpublished opinions take
less of the court's time than published opinions because they do not require the
court to explain extensively its reasoning and do not require as much in-depth
review and circulation among the judges. 2 However, while courts use judicial
notice and unpublished opinions to increase the efficiency of the judicial system,
both measures could have similar shortcomings: while intended to increase the
temporal efficiency of judicial decision making, these two tools may actually
decrease the quality of judicial opinions.
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit wrote an
unpublished opinion, United States v. Newland.3 In Newland, a police officer
pulled over the defendant for speeding while heading north on 1-95.4 After
returning to the police vehicle and making an unsuccessful warrant check in the
defendant's name, 5 the officer detained the defendant for thirteen minutes while
waiting for a canine unit to arrive to search the vehicle. 6 The canine search
revealed 7narcotics and a bag of cash in the car, and the defendant was taken into
custody.
At trial, the defendant's counsel moved to suppress the evidence seized as a
result of the canine unit search of the defendant's vehicle. 8 Thus, the
determinative issue became whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to
detain the defendant and to have the canine check the vehicle after the officer9
discovered that there were no outstanding warrants for the defendant's arrest.
After the district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, the

1. Christopher Onstott, Judicial Notice and the Law's "Scientific" Search for Truth, 40
AKRON L. REv. 465, 465 (2007).
2.
See Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1297 (2004) (quoting Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001));
J. Jason Boyeskie, Comment, A Matter of Opinion: FederalRule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 60 ARK. L. REV. 955, 959-60 (2008) (citing Alex Kozinski &
Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished
Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43, 43-44). Published opinions can take weeks to write
because courts circulate the proposed opinions among the judges for review, yet judges can write
unpublished opinions in a few hours because they only need to cite a couple of opinions explaining
their reasoning. Boyeskie, supra, at 960 (citing Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra, at 43).
3.
246 F. App'x 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
4.
Id.at 182.
5.
Id.at 182-83.
6.
Id.at 183, 187.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.at 182-83.
9.
See id.at 187.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1207

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 16
1208

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60: 1207

prosecution appealed. 10 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
suppression of the evidence, finding that the officer had reasonable
11 suspicion to
detain the defendant and to have the canine unit check the vehicle.
The majority stated that reasonable suspicion is more than an officer's
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion" or a "hunch that criminal activity is
afoot," 12 and that the factors creating a reasonable suspicion for a search and
seizure must "'eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers."' 13 The
Fourth Circuit found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the
defendant because the defendant had shaky hands, presented the officer with
multiple addresses, had multiple cell phones in the vehicle, and had travel plans
that would prevent him from returning his rental car before the rental agreement
expired.14 The majority also relied on the officer's suspicion that the defendant's
Virgin Islands driver's license was fake, even though the district court had
examined the license and failed to find the abnormalities described by the
officer. 15
In addition to the above factors, the Fourth Circuit took udicial notice that I95 is "a major thoroughfare for narcotics trafficking,"1 finding that 1-95's
reputation as a well-known drug corridor was sufficient to conclude that travel
on 1-95 is "a valid factor in a reasonable suspicion analysis." 17 In taking judicial
notice of this fact, the majority relied on five Fourth Circuit decisions, three of
which were unpublished opinions.19 While the majority noted that "each state in
this circuit through which 1-95 passes has acknowledged its reputation as a drug
corridor," 20 it also recognized that this
21 was the first time that the Fourth Circuit
had taken judicial notice of this fact.
The dissent in Newland argued that the majority's reliance on these
decisions to support taking judicial notice of 1-95 as a drug corridor was

10. Id. at 182.
11. Id.at 190.
12. Id. at 188 (quoting United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. (quoting United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004)).
14. Id. at 189 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984); Foreman, 369 F.3d at
785; Brugal, 209 F.3d at 359).
15. Id. at 188.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Brugal, 209 F.3d at 358 n.5).
18. Id. (citing United States v. Vidal, 119 F. App'x 510, 511 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision); Brugal, 209 F.3d at 358 n.5; United States v. Raymond, 152 F.3d 309,
311 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Thorpe, 36 F.3d 1095, at *1 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision); United States v. Bodie, 983 F.2d 1058, at *1 (4th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam) (unpublished table decision)).
19. See Vidal, 119 F. App'x 510; Thorpe, 36 F.3d 1095; Bodie, 983 F.2d 1058.
20. Newland, 246 F. App'x at 188 (citing Vidal, 119 F. App'x at 511; Brugal, 209 F.3d at
358 n.5; Thorpe, 36 F.3d 1095, at *1; Bodie, 983 F.2d 1058, at *1; Limonja v. Commonwealth, 383
S.E.2d 476, 482 (Va. Ct. App. 1989)).
21. Id.
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misguided, suggesting that the majority "mischaracteriz[ed]" three of these
decisions.22 As noted by the dissent, each of these five cases contains important
differences that distinguish
S 23them from the facts in Newland and make their use
as precedent inappropriate.

22. Id. at 194 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing Brugal, 209 F.3d at 360; Raymond, 152 F.3d at
311; Bodie, 1992 WL 389290, at *1).
23. First, Newland cited United States v. Brugal to support taking judicial notice in its
reasonable suspicion analysis. Id. at 188 (citing Brugal, 209 F.3d at 358 n.5). In Brugal, the court
noted that "[I-95] is a major thoroughfare for narcotics trafficking" and found that a police officer
had reasonable suspicion to instruct a driver stopped at a checkpoint off of 1-95 to pull to the side of
the road. Brugal, 209 F.3d at 359-60. However, Brugal relied heavily on two facts that made
Brugal significantly different than Newland: (1) the defendant left 1-95 at a dark exit immediately
after seeing a police checkpoint sign, and (2) the defendant claimed that he exited 1-95 to look for a
gas station even though he had a quarter tank of gas left and could not see any gas stations from the
highway. Id. at 360-61. Furthermore, Brugal was not appropriate precedent for the Newland's use
of judicial notice because Brugal did not hold that 1-95 was a drug corridor because the parties did
not dispute the status of 1-95. Newland, 246 F. App'x at 195 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing Brugal,
209 F.3d at 360).
Second, Newland cited United States v. Raymond to support its characterization of 1-95 in its
reasonable suspicion analysis. Id. at 188 (citing Raymond, 152 F.3d at 311). In Raymond, the court
found that a police officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying a weapon
because after the officer pulled over the defendant's vehicle, the defendant clutched his stomach
while exiting the car awkwardly. Raymond, 152 F.3d at 311-12. The Newland court's reliance on
Raymond was improper because Raymond "did not make any findings about 1-95's status as a drug
corridor." Newland, 246 F. App'x at 194-95 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Rather, Raymond merely
noted that the officers were members of a drug trafficking police unit that patrolled 1-95. Id. (citing
Raymond, 152 F.3d at 311). Newland therefore extended the dicta in Raymond too far by inferring
that Raymond's observation that the stop involved a drug trafficking unit justified judicial notice
that 1-95 is a drug trafficking thoroughfare.
Third, Newland cited United States v. Vidal to support taking judicial notice. Id. at 188 (citing
Vidal, 119 F. App'x at 511). Newland's reliance on Vidal was misplaced because Vidal relied on
Brugal's characterization of 1-95 as a factor establishing reasonable suspicion, Vidal, 119 F. App'x
at 511 (citing Brugal, 209 F.3d at 358), even though Brugal did not hold that 1-95 was a major drug
thoroughfare, Newland, 246 F. App'x at 195 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing Brugal, 209 F.3d at
360). Furthermore, Vidal has little precedential value because it is a brief unpublished opinion that
contains little reasoning for its decision to affirm a lower court's conviction of the defendant. See
Vidal, 119 F. App'x at 511.
The fourth case Newland cited to support taking judicial notice was United States v. Bodie.
Newland, 246 F. App'x at 188 (citing Bodie, 983 F.2d 1058, at *1). In Bodie, the defendants were
driving slowly in a Richmond, Virginia neighborhood. Bodie, 983 F.2d 1058, at *1. After seeing
numerous Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in a nearby parking lot, the defendants
fled the neighborhood, and the agents chased them onto 1-195 and then onto 1-95. Id. The Newland
court's citation to Bodie was improper because the reasonableness of the search and seizure did not
depend on whether the stop occurred on 1-95; the police stopped the vehicle due to the car chase that
began in a neighborhood. See id.; see also Newland, 246 F. App'x at 195 (Gregory, J., dissenting)
(citing Bodie, 983 F.2d 1058, at *1) (arguing that Bodie "dealt not with the status of 1-95" as a drug
trafficking thoroughfare, but with the status of the neighborhood street where the chase began)).
Lastly, Newland cited United States v. Thorpe. Newland, 246 F. App'x at 188 (citing Thorpe,
36 F.3d 1095, at *1). In Thorpe, a police officer pulled over a defendant for speeding north on 1-95
in Maryland, and the Fourth Circuit found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to search the
defendant's car because of the defendant's suspicious actions, the defendant's travel plans, and I95's reputation as a drug corridor. Thorpe, 36 F.3d 1095, at *5. However, Thorpe's characterization
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The dissent also offered three reasons why the police officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. First, judicial notice of 1-95's
reputation alone does not satisfy reasonable suspicion because the defendant's
mere presence on 1-95 could not remove any drivers on 1-95-much less a
"substantial portion of innocent drivers" -from reasonable suspicion.
Second, the dissent claimed the majority inaccurately characterized 1-95 as a
major thoroughfare for drug trafficking because statistical evidence suggested
that vehicles traveling northbound on 1-95 in Maryland-the state where the
defendant was initially stopped-are just as likely to contain drugs as vehicles
traveling on any other road in that state.25 Given the statistical data available to
the court, the dissent argued that the majority should not have taken judicial
26
notice of the proposition that 1-95 is a major thoroughfare for drug trafficking.
The dissent's third reason for determining that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion was that absent the improper judicial notice, the other factors-the
defendant's nervous demeanor, rental agreement, irregular travel plans, cell
phones, and driver's license-did not collectively establish reasonable suspicion
to detain the defendant.2 7 The majority should have accorded only minimal
weight to the defendant's nervous demeanor because there was no evidence that

of 1-95 contradicted statistical evidence that northbound travelers on 1-95 are not any more likely to
be trafficking drugs than other travelers on Maryland roads. Newland, 246 F. App'x at 194
(Gregory, J., dissenting).

24. See Newland, 246 F. App'x at 196 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 193 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes,
Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 658
(2002) (examining stop data compiled by the Maryland State Police)). Aside from the statistical
evidence highlighted by the dissent, there are fundamental problems with taking judicial notice of I95's reputation as a drug corridor. Courts traditionally take judicial notice of facts relating to
history, government records, government personnel, and geography. See MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 330 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). An example would be whether the property
on which a crime occurred is subject to federal subject matter jurisdiction. See William M. Carter,
Jr., "Trust Me, I'm a Judge": Why Binding Judicial Notice of JurisdictionalFacts Violates the
Right to Jury Trial, 68 Mo. L. REV. 649, 649 (2003). Traditionally noticed facts are easily
distinguishable from broad characterizations of highways because parties do not need statistical
evidence to verify the accuracy of traditionally noticed facts; rather, parties can consult government
documents or maps to determine if judicial notice of those facts was proper.
26. Newland, 246 F. App'x at 194 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Past vehicle-search profiles
created by the DEA bolster the dissent's argument because they "suggest[] that drugs travel[] south
from New York City to the Baltimore/D.C. metropolitan area." Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the
Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089,
1111 (2005) (citing David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues That the U.S. Wrote the Book on
Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at Al). Furthermore, a statistical study of vehicle
searches on 1-95 found that travelers driving south on 1-95 in Maryland are 11.15 times more likely
to traffic drugs than travelers driving north on the same stretch of highway. Id. at 1133. Indeed,
southbound travel on 1-95 was almost the only "statistically significant [variable] in predicting
whether a stopped driver is a drug courier." Id.
27. Newland, 246 F. App'x at 196 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
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the nervous demeanor was abnormally severe. 28 Furthermore, the rental
agreement was only minimally probative of reasonable suspicion because the
late return of rental cars does not necessarily suggest the commission of a
crime.29 Lastly, the majority should not have used the officer's testimony about
the defendant's license to find reasonable suspicion because, upon examination
of the license, the district court rejected the argument that the license was an
30
"obvious fake" and excluded the license from its reasonable suspicion analysis.
Therefore, the dissent concluded that these factors show that the officer did not
have reasonable suspicion absent the majority's improper use of judicial notice.
Accordingly, the majority should have upheld the district court's suppression of
the evidence found in the resulting search.
Newland demonstrates that the use of judicial notice in unpublished opinions
increases the risk that judicial notice will improperly influence later decisions
and create result-oriented precedent that the appellate court did not collectively
analyze.
While the common law required litigating parties to present proof of each
issue in their case, courts could take judicial notice of "facts about which
reasonable men could not differ.' ' 31 The underlying policy goals of judicial
notice were two-fold: First, judicial notice allowed courts to decide issues
without requiring 32
adversarial argument, thereby reducing the administrative
burdens on courts. Second, limiting judicial notice to issues not reasonably
disputable protected
parties' right to dispute facts significantly influencing a
33
case's outcome.
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence codifies a limited version of this
common law doctrine. 34 Under Rule 201, judicially noticed facts cannot be
"subject to reasonable dispute in that [they are] either (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready

28. See id. at 197 (Gregory, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120,
1127 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001))
("Only extraordinary and prolonged nervousness can weigh significantly in the assessment of
reasonable suspicion."); United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2004)
("[A]lthough nervousness has been considered in finding reasonable suspicion in conjunction with
other factors, it is an unreliable indicator, especially in the context of a traffic stop. Many citizens
become nervous during a traffic stop, even when they have nothing to hide or fear." (citing United
States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1228
(6th Cir. 1983))); Williams, 271 F.3d at 1268 (noting that mere "nervousness is 'of limited
significance' in the reasonable suspicion inquiry, but that "[e]xtreme and continued nervousness
... 'is entitled to somewhat more weight"' (quoting United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179
(10th Cir. 2000))).
29. See Newland, 246 F. App'x at 198 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 195 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
31. Dennis J. Turner, JudicialNotice and Federal Rule of Evidence 201-A Rule Ready for
Change, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 181 (1983).
32. See Kenneth Culp Davis, JudicialNotice, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 984 (1955).
33. See id.
34. Turner, supra note 31 (citing FED. R. EVID. 201).
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determination35 by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.,

Perhaps the most significant way in which Rule 201 is distinguishable from
common law judicial notice is that the federal rule differentiates between
"adjudicative" and "legislative" facts. 3 6 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis coined
the terminology "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts to clarify how judicial
notice should be limited.37 Whether in a criminal or civil case, the trier of fact
uses facts adjudicatively to make judgments that directly concern the parties, the
circumstances of the case, and the background of the case 38--who did what,
where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent. ' 39 In contrast, judges use
facts legislatively to create "law or policy," 4 0 such as whether
certain conduct
41
requires a standard of ordinary negligence or gross negligence.
In formulating Rule 201, the Advisory Committee relied heavily on Davis's
work.42 The Committee determined that judicial notice of legislative facts should
not be limited in the same way as judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 4 3 As a
result, Rule 201 does not limit judicial notice of legislative facts, but only limits
judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 44 Under Rule 201, judicial notice of
adjudicative facts is limited to facts not subject to reasonable dispute because
adjudicative facts directly affect the parties and therefore have a stronger impact
on the case's outcome. 45 For example, using judicial notice of convict recidivism
rates to determine whether a defendant is guilty-an adjudicative use-is much

35. FEDR. EVID. 201(b).
36. See FED.R.EVID. 2 0 1(a) advisory committee's note.
37. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV.L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
38. Id. at 402.
39.

2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.5 (4th ed. 2002).

40. Davis, supra note 37, at 402.
41. See United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir. 1976) ("A court generally relies
upon legislative facts when it purports to develop a particular law or policy ....). The distinction
between adjudicative and legislative facts ultimately reflects how courts use those facts because a
single fact often has adjudicative and legislative properties. Carter, supra note 25, at 662 ("Whether
a fact is adjudicative or legislative depends not on the nature of the fact-e.g., who owns the landbut rather on the use made of it (i.e., whether it is a fact germane to what happened in the case or a
fact useful in formulating common law policy or interpreting a statute) and the same fact can play
either role depending on context." (quoting United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1999))).
42. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
43. Id.
44. Fed. R. Evid. 201(a).
45. Turner, supra note 31, at 182. In addition to the explicit limits imposed on judicial notice,
the 1974 alteration to Rule 201 reinforces that appellate courts should be cautious in taking judicial
notice on appeal. The Advisory Committee imposed the requirement that a judge instruct the jury
that judicial notice is not binding in criminal proceedings. FED. R. EVID. 201(g). The Committee
reasoned that binding the jury to a judge's judicial notice would be improper in criminal trials
because binding notice would conflict with the "spirit" of the constitutional right to a jury trial. FED.
R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, at 6-7 (1973), as reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7080). In addition, the judge's role in criminal trials is "limited to
deciding issues of law and facilitating the jury's fact-finding." Carter, supra note 25.
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more significant to the specific defendant's case than using recidivism rates to
establish convict parole policy-a legislative use. In Newland, the court used I95's drug trafficking reputation as an adjudicative fact because 1-95's reputation
affected whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion to search the
vehicle.46
Because using judicial notice can influence the outcome of a case
significantly-such as establishing a fact that, along with other facts, creates
reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant during a routine traffic stop-recent
developments in the operation of federal appellate courts suggests that courts
should be particularly cautious in taking judicial notice, especially when writing
unpublished opinions.
To address the "crisis of volume" in appellate court workloads, 47 federal
appellate courts have attempted to allocate judges' time more efficiently by
"using staff attorneys to screen cases, eliminating oral argument in many cases,
relying• • on
,,48 law clerks to draft opinions, and reducing the publication of
opinions.
Over time, each circuit has also created different procedural rules
prescribing when courts and attorneys could cite unpublished opinions.49 In
response, in 2006 Congress published Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure to streamline these differing rules. 50 Effectively, Rule 32.1
requires that appellate courts allow
citation to federal unpublished opinions
"
"issued on or after January 1, 2007. 51
Whether appellate courts should allow citation to unpublished opinions is
controversial because it forces courts to choose between two imperfect options.
On one hand, appellate courts might devote more resources to unpublished
opinions because of Rule 32.1, which could undermine the efficiency goal that
these opinions serve. On the other hand, appellate courts might devote the same
minimal resources to develop unpublished opinions as they did before Rule 32.1
was enacted, despite the risk that unpublished opinions might create precedent
53
even when those opinions provide little factual analysis or legal reasoning.
Neither of these options is preferable because courts do not want to eliminate the

46. See United States v. Newland, 246 F. App'x 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (Gregory, J.,
dissenting).
47. Pearson, supra note 2, at 1235 n.1 (citing COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 14 TBL.2-3 (1998) [hereinafter STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES REPORT], available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/final/appstruc.pdf).

From 1974 to 2006, appellate filings increased from 19,657 filings per year to 66,618 filings per
year. Id.; see also Boyeskie, supra note 2, at 961 (observing that appellate filings increased from
37,524 filings per year in 1988 to 66,618 filings per year in 2006) (citing FED. COURTS STUDY
COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 10-28 (1990))).
48. Pearson, supra note 2, at 1235 (citing STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note
47, at 22 tbls.2-6 & 2-7, 23-24 tbl.2-8).
49. Id. at 1235-36.
50. Boyeskie, supra note 2, at 955 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 32.1).
51. Id. (citing FED. R. APP. P. 32.1).
52. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001).
53. See id.
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efficiency of writing unpublished opinions nor do they want to risk citation to
precedent that could influence future case law.
Before Rule 32.1, critics argued that appellate rules prohibiting the citation
of unpublished opinions "created a 'secret' body of unpublished law" that
removed court decisions from the principle of stare decisis. 54 Because stare
decisis requires that courts treat similar cases alike, these critics argued that nocitation rules for unpublished opinions caused "seemingly arbitrary decisionmaking in the federal courts, and thereby violated one of the foundational
principles of the American legal system." 55 Researchers also found that man 6
courts were not limiting the use of unpublished opinions to "easy" cases.
Contrary to original intentions, an increasing number of unpublished opinions
reversed lower court decisions, 57 and dissents and concurrences in unpublished
opinions increased.58
Rule 32.1 lessens the concern that unpublished opinions will not comport
with stare decisis, yet the failure to provide adequate reasoning in unpublished
opinions diminishes courts' and attorneys' abilities to determine what the law
is, 59 especially because courts continue to write unpublished opinions for

54. Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential:A Recipe for Ethical
Problems & Legal Malpractice?,26 Miss. C. L. REv. 185, 194 (2007); see also Sarah E. Ricks, The
Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A Case Study of the
Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REv. 217,
228 (2006) (arguing that non-precedential unpublished opinions create risks, including "doctrinal
shifts from precedential decisions; uncertainty about the persuasive value of non-binding decisions
by the hierarchically superior court; mistaken predictions of an opinion's future usefulness; and
unpredictability of judicial outcomes"); Bradley Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by
Rule?, 67 01110 ST. L.J. 645, 649 (2006) ("[Given] the fact that eighty-two percent of all federal
court of appeals decisions are 'unpublished,' the reality is that stare decisis is now being abrogated
with respect to tens of thousands of decisions each year."); Drew R. Quitschau, Note, Anastasoff v.
United States: Uncertainty in the Eighth Circuit-Is There a Constitutional Right to Cite
Unpublished Opinions?, 54 ARK. L. REv. 847, 878 (2002) ("[N]o-citation rule[s] clearly curtail[]
litigants' rights by preventing citation of unpublished opinions and expands the power of the court
by allowing it to ignore prior case law."); Marla Brooke Tusk, Note, No-Citation Rules as a Prior
Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1207 (2003) ("No-citation rules have
effectively taken unpublished opinions outside the realm of stare decisis.").
55. Solomon, supra note 54.
56. Id.
57. Id. From 1978 to 2000, the number of unpublished opinions reversing lower court
decisions rose from 1,018 to 2,156, increasing the percentage of unpublished opinions reversing
lower court opinions from 14% in 1978 to 21% in 2000. Id. (citing Michael Hannon, A Closer Look
at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199,
216 (2001)).
58. Id. at 195.
59. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Response: The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 38 (2005). Furthermore, Rule 32.1 leaves the
precedential value of unpublished opinions ambiguous because, as the committee notes, the Rule
does not dictate how lawyers and courts should use unpublished decisions; it only pertains to
citation of unpublished opinions. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee's note; see also Bryan
Wright, Note, But What Will They Do Without Unpublished Opinions?: Some Alternatives for
Dealing with the Ninth Circuit's Massive Caseload Post F.R.A.P. 32.1, 7 NEV. L.J. 239, 252 (2006)
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difficult cases such as Newland.6° Therefore, appellate courts should be hesitant
to take judicial notice in unpublished opinions because of the risk that judicial
notice will be used in ways that improperly influence the court's decisions.
Furthermore, under Rule 32.1, one court may cite the use of judicial notice in a
second court's opinion as support for its own judicial notice; however, improper
judicial notice in the second court's opinion could ultimately influence the first
court's final decision.
Newland's status as an unpublished opinion compounds its risk to future
judicial decisions because courts now can cite unpublished opinions as precedent
under Rule 32.1. Therefore, courts and parties may cite Newland in their
reasonable suspicion analyses in future cases even though Newland may have
mischaracterized precedent and improperly used judicial notice, leading to a
result-oriented decision.
At least one court has cited Newland for the proposition
that 1-95 is a drug61
trafficking thoroughfare. In United States v. Gooden, the United States District
court for the Eastern District of North Carolina decided a case similar to
Newland.62 Gooden was an unpublished opinion that considered whether a police
officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of a traffic stop to search
a defendant's vehicle on 1-95. 63 Like the defendant in Newland, the defendant in
Gooden provided the police officer with fake identification from Jamaica and a
rental agreement signed by someone other than the defendant. 64 Holding that the
vehicle search was constitutional regardless of whether the defendant consented
to the search, the Gooden court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to
extend the traffic stop and search the vehicle. 65 In finding reasonable suspicion,
Gooden cited Newland's recognition that 1-95 is "'a major thoroughfare for
narcotics trafficking' and [that] other cases from the court of appeals and district
courts have long recognized this fact in reasonable suspicion analyses. ' 66 Thus,
Newland's improper use of judicial notice and mischaracterization of precedent

(citing Letter from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to Anthony J.
Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 30 (Dec. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP12-2002.pdf) (arguing that the Rule's language "does not
address what precedential value should be given to unpublished opinions" and noting that the Rule's
Committee Note states that the rule does not take a position on that point). Nevertheless, courts will
use unpublished opinions as precedent because they will be reluctant to ignore previous holdings of
the court. Schiltz, supra, at 40 (citing Letter from John L. Coffey et al., Circuit Judges, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate
Rules 1 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/AppellateComments_2003/03AP-396.pdf).
60. See Solomon, supra note 54, at 194.
61. No. 5:06-CR-313-FL, 2007 WL 1875544, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 27, 2007).
62. See id.
63. Id. at *3.
64. Id. at *1.
65. Id. at *3-4.
66. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Newland, 246 F. App'x 180, 188 (4th Cir. 2007)).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 16
1216

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:1207

directly affected the reasonable suspicion analysis in Gooden even though
Newland was an unpublished opinion.
Newland demonstrates why parties and courts in the Fourth Circuit should
be aware of the effect of judicial notice on the outcomes of cases, especially
when those decisions become unpublished opinions. Although judicial notice
and unpublished opinions increase efficiency in the judicial process, using
judicial notice in unpublished opinions further increases the risk that a court will
improperly accept as fact some propositions on which reasonable minds may
disagree. Furthermore, a case's status as an unpublished opinion is no longer a
shield that prevents the case from affecting future decisions because current
appellate rules allow courts to cite unpublished opinions, risking future use of
unpublished precedent even though judicial notice improperly influenced that
precedent.
Brett Hubler
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